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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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January 31, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VERIFICATION PANEL WORKING GROUP

SUBJECT: SALT - NAC Consultation on FBS


The attached draft telegram to USNATO has been prepared in light of discussion at the January 30 Verification Panel meeting. Your comments and clearance would be appreciated by no later than close of business February 2.

Robert A. Martin  
PM/DCA

Attachment:

As stated.

cc: NSC - Mr. Odeen  
CIA - [redacted]  
25X1A JCS - Col. Von Ins  
OSD - Dr. Tucker  
ACDA - Mr. Keeny



25X1A

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DRAFT TELEGRAM TO USNATO

SUBJECT: Consultations on FBS in SALT TWO

REF: USNATO 440 and 444

1. We are prepared to participate in further NAC consideration and discussion of handling of FBS problem in SALT, but our posture will be one essentially of listening to and eliciting Allies views on various ways of handling this subject and their respective merits and demerits.
2. USREP should recall how discussion of this subject within SALT has developed and recapitulate position Soviets have taken. You should reemphasize that our fundamental objective in SALT TWO remains to deal in a satisfactory way with central strategic systems (SLBMs, ICBMs and heavy bombers) and to replace interim freeze with agreement which provides for satisfactory equality in these systems. The problem is whether and how we should deal with Soviet position that taking FBS into account is essential element of any agreement dealing with central systems.
3. You should stress that US has not repeat not made up its mind on either substance or tactics of handling this question when SALT resumes. Allied views will be an important element in making up our minds on position we shall take, since we

SECRET

2

recognize central importance of FBS problem to our Allies. We do not wish to take lead in such discussion except in sense of describing how situation has developed in past negotiations. We do not wish at this time to point to any particular way of dealing with this problem, on which either NAC or we will be frozen. What we wish is general airing of alternatives that our Allies see for handling this matter and their views thereon as general background for our own policy considerations. Needless to say, when, with benefit of this discussion, we adopt a concrete negotiating approach we would bring this before the Council.

4. FYI. NAC endorsement of trying out a general non-circumvention formula some time in resumed negotiations would appear to be no problem in light of past discussion. The timing and tactics of exploring such an approach with the Russians would be left to our discretion. We would not wish to indicate support or rejection of such an approach. In final analysis, we would not rpt not wish NAC discussion to develop in such a way that we could not, should it appear necessary or desirable, come back to NAC with another approach should non-circumvention formula be unproductive in helping us achieve our SALT negotiating objectives. END FYI